Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Introduction -- John T. PARRY: Pain, Interrogation, and the Body: State Violence and the Law of Torture -- Fernando PURCELL: "Too Many Foreigners for My Taste": Law, Race and Ethnicity in California, 1848-1852 -- Shani D'CRUZE: Protection, Harm and Social Evil: The Age of Consent, c. 1885-c. 1940 -- Ruth A. MILLER: Sin, Scandal, and Disaster: Politics and Crime in Contemporary Turkey -- İştar GÖZAYD1N: Adding Injury To Injury: The Case of Rape and Prostitution in Turkey -- Dani FILC (...) and Hadas ZIV: Exception as the Norm and the Fiction of Sovereignty: The Lack of the Right to Health Care in the Occupied Territories -- Alban BURKE: Mental Health Care During Apartheid in South Africa: An Illustration of How "Science" Can be Abused -- Rui ZHU: Schistosomiasis and Capital Marxism -- Elena A. BAYLIS: The Inevitable Impunity of Suicide Terrorists -- Douglas J. SYLVESTER: The Lessons of Nuremberg and the Trial of Saddam Hussein -- Kirsten AINLEY: Responsibility for Atrocity: Individual Criminal Agency and the International Criminal Court -- Roberto BUONAMANO: Humanity and Inhumanity: State Power and the Force of Law in the Prescription of Juridical Norms -- Vincent LUIZZI: New Balance, Evil, and the Scales of Justice -- Jody LYNEÉ MADEIRA: The Execution as Sacrifice -- Bram IEVEN: Legitimacy and Violence: On the Relation between Law and Justice According to Rawls and Derrida -- Notes on Contributors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ACTUAL INFINITE IN ARISTOTLE Prolegomena: Philosophy and Theology Related HENEVER PHILOSOPHY is taken to be the handmaiden of theology, then the autonomy of reason is destroyed." Such a daim should be distinguished from a still 1stronger thesis. Compare: " A philosopher may not legitimately try to fortify an argument by bringing in new premises from another discipline which has a special aura of authority." Quite how Aristotle would (...) have reacted to the first generalization, if it had been suitably translated for his scrutiny, is a question on which commentators might agree to differ. But Aristotle would have been as!'eluctant as Aquinas, or Maimonides, or later Monotheists who treasured the Physics, to leave the second general claim unquestioned. Natural and revealed theology, like physics or mathematics, are domains where extremely subtle reasoner1s have studied and published widely for a very long time. So an elementary respect for induction suggests that philosophers should e:x;pect to benefit from,applying some premises and some ways of arguing, which are found in theology, to their own issues. I speak of premises and ways of arguing that philosophers qua philosophers have not provided before. Thinkers in all four disciplines could thus profit from each body of work. Even the law of averages is set pitilessly against the second general claim.1 1 The late Father F. C. Copleston, S.J., covers many important topics regarding theology and philosophy in Aquinets (Baltimore: Peng11in, 1955), pp. 12-14, 19, 54-63, 65-68, 74, 116, etc. But the point put forward here about human power to strengthen intuition in one field seems to be partly missed. Copleston also fails to dwell enough on infinity in various passages. See John King-Farlow, "The First ·way in Physical and Moral Space", The Thomist 427 428 JOHN KING-FARLOW By focussing on some arguments of Aristotle's against the admissibility of an,actual infinite, we shall find deeper, less obvims reasons for rejecting that second claim. Other philosophical points of intrinsic value should emerge as well foom the short investigation. But this one is especially interesting because of its curious pertinence to perennial disagreements among those who address the relations of theology, theism and philosophy. At any rate, the search for such deeper reasons will involve the application to Aristotle's texts of a somewhat modern way of using the term " intuition ". Introduotion: A Relevant Kind of Intuitive Thinking Diss,atisfaction with modern Platonism in higher mathematics may be added to disenchantment with Platonism's modern opponents. Such opposition may seem too technical for issues of intuition or, indeed, of common reason. And so one is led back to consider certain rightly famous arguments of Aristotle. But before turning to Aristotle and his grapplings with ideais and claims about an actual infinity, let us 1ook at a few very ordinary uses of the sometimes charismatic word "intuition." Webster's Dictionary (1978) offers: "immediate and instinctive perception of a truth; direct understanding without reasoning." In his classic study Evolution of JJ;Jathematieal Concepts, Wilder writes at least once in the spirit of Webster: "Counting with fingers (and toes) clearly involves intuitive recognition of (1-1)-correspontreme, excessive gene:msity, and, next, irion unwillingness to give ·anything to others, lies usually much closer to the first extreme. Between utter recklessness and self-paralyzing caution the Mean may oscillate in relative distance, according to the demands of the context. Near recklessness may offer the only means to win one kind of battle and a stubborn refusal to move may be needed for the nex>t victory. By pursuing such a nonmechanical and variably positioned ideal of a Mean, a really wise father usually oould show special favor to one specially deserving child in some ways and some contexts, yet generally show very satisfying love to a;ll his children. 11 Richard Bosley, " What Is a Mean? The Question Considered Compara· tively and Systematically." PhiloB. (shrink)

It is increasingly fashionable to attack McTaggart's arguments about the Unreality of Time with a minimum of attention to what he was trying to establish. Those who have only read his one still famous paper ‘The Unreality of Time’ [III] are too likely to assume from professional philosophers' current counter-arguments that the man was a sceptic with only a single idea in his head, rather than an ingenious, constructive metaphysician. Since so much formal and informal analysis has been directed against (...) so few of McTaggart's comments on Time, and mainly against his destructive claim that the vulgar concept of Time requires as explicans an incoherent ‘A-series’ of becomings with ever-shifted pasts, presents and futures, perhaps it is time to encourage some redirection of analytical assessment to what he was arguing for. I say this not only for historical reasons, though I shall draw historical comparisons, but because rationally assessing what McTaggart really denies about Time may require some serious interest in what he so interestingly asserts about our experience of what we call ‘Time’. Trousers, pace Austin, normally have one wearer but two legs. If McTaggart's negative points deserve such a plethora of analysis, then the positive view needs attention or the analysis is ill-aimed. (shrink)

Debate continues to rage among philosophers of religion over Anthony Flew's famous little paper ‘Theology and Falsification’ and the responses it provoked, most notably R. M. Hare's response that religious claims are in no way like scientific hypotheses. For now, twenty years later, we still find many theists taking a similar tack to Hare's. A particularly interesting example is J. F. Miller in Religious Studies, 1969, who replies to Flew that propositions like ‘God loves mankind’ cannot be subject to falsifiability (...) conditions because they are used as claims expressing ‘religious first-order principles of the Judaeo-Christian Weltanschauung and as such are not amenable to falsification’ (p. 50). Miller seems to put his faith in some kind of great gulf fixed between what he would consider decently falsifiable scientific hypotheses and what he takes to be unfalsifiable first-order principles both of theology and of contemporary science. In what follows we will try to sketch a more rational strategy for modern believers of a liberal empiricist type, for those whose interest in appealing and deferring to experience includes but is not restricted to so-called ‘sense experience’. This will involve accepting analogies between theological statements and so-called hypotheses, insofar as the latter are propositions held and put forward in a somewhat tentative spirit with a view to explaining what we experience. (shrink)

NO ANALOGY IS ADEQUATE FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PERSONS OF THE TRINITY. A FAMOUS AND HELPFUL ONE OF ST AUGUSTINE’S IS DISCUSSED AND AN INADEQUACY SUGGESTED: TRIPLENESS OF PERSONS IS TOO RESTRICTED. ANOTHER LIMITED, BUT PARTLY OFFSETTING ANALOGY COUCHED IN TERMS OF ’MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES’ IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY IS SPELLED OUT FOR EVALUATION.

In his well known paper ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ Professor Rush Rhees has rightly criticized some appeals that Wittgenstein made to certain so-called ‘primitive languages’ while developing the early sections of the Philosophical Investigations. These appeals are taken by Wittgenstein to expose the shortcomings of an account given by Augustine at Confessions I, 8 of meaning and of learning language. I shall try first in this discussion to make it clear that at least some of Rhees’ criticisms and complaints are made for (...) very dubious reasons. Then I shall try to show that there are much better reasons for dissatisfaction, reasons which may tie up with recurrent muddles in Wittgenstein’s later thought. It will be contended that there is real point in construing several Wittgensteinian appeals to primitive languages as being somewhat vitiated by a systematic mistake. For, if I am right, a curious ambivalence arises in the text which results from confusion about what is largely false, because it is so inadequate, and what is wholly in error, because it is so fundamentally incoherent as to invite the label ‘Nonsense’. (shrink)

In approaching the subject of this symposium we have both worked from an assumption about the future of philosophia perennis. This is that a better general assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language in his Philosophical Investigations is likely to lead to better work in the crucial areas of metaphysics and epistemology. We shall not argue for this assumption here. But we begin by stating it to make clear why we shall attempt some particular assessments of a few passages early (...) in the Investigations and of a few famous remarks offered about them by Wittgenstein’s close disciple and critical commentator, Rush Rhees. For we are flirting with at least two further assumptions. A stronger and riskier one is that the strengths and weaknesses of the Investigations’ initial discussions may well have had a profound effect on the wisdom of the work as a whole. A weaker one is that if we can find sources of error as well as inspiration in some of Wittgenstein’s beginning remarks and in some of his dedicated followers’ comments, then other philosophers will be less intimidated by his philosophical and literary genius or by the obvious talents of many who are called Wittgensteinians. Thus we hope that our particular investigations can contribute to a more effective general assessment of his philosophy of language and so stimulate further hopes among those who believe—as we do—that the most central problems of philosophy can gradually be solved but never be dissolved. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:MEANING AND SAYING: Essay in the Philosophy of Language By Frank B. EbersoleGOD AND THE SOUL By Peter GeachTHE MORAL MEANING OF REVOLUTION By Jon P. Gunnemann.

G. E. Moore’s famous “Refutation of Idealism” and related essays, like “Hume’s Philosophy” in his Philosophical Studies, signaled the rise of a passionate belief. That is, we cannot use less obviously lucid and acceptable claims or arguments to defeat propositions that are most clear and most obviously true by our plainest human standards. The plurality of material objects in material space is assured for us by the high degree of clarity and assuredness of our propositions about hands, trees, meals, clocks, (...) clouds, and rainfall. The soundness of belief in matter, time, space, and the plurality of material objects is upheld by such ordinary and obviously true propositions about the familiar. And the massive number of such commonsensical propositions makes the task of idealists and skeptics supremely unpromising. (shrink)

AT LEAST ONE MODEL OF THE RATIONAL RELIGIOUS BELIEVER EXISTS: PRIMARY COMMITMENT TO DISCOVERING TRUTH AND ACTING RIGHTLY; COMMITMENT TO A RELIGION FLOWING FROM THOSE PRIMARY ONES; SOME DEGREE OF TENTATIVENESS ABOUT FAITH; SEARCHING FOR PROBABILITY, MORE THAN CERTAINTY; FAITH CONSTITUTING A PARTLY MORAL WAGER AIMED AT MAXIMIZING EXPECTED UTILITIES OF CERTAIN KINDS; A TOLERANT WISDOM ABOUT COMMITMENTS (AND ORDERINGS) PARTLY PLEASING TO SUCH SECULAR THINKERS AS MILL, QUINE AND POPPER, ALSO AQUINAS, BARTLEY AND WILLIAM JAMES; PRIMARY LOVE FOR GOD (...) AS THE SUPREME JUSTIFIER OF HUMAN JUSTIFIER OF HUMAN HISTORY--GOD’S POWER BEING TREATED AS SECONDARY TO HIS GOODNESS. (TOPICS INCLUDE: MIRACLES, IS AND OUGHT, PROBABILITY, WAGERS, PROOFS, TIME, WAR). (shrink)

This note attempts first to broaden the investigation of ties expressed by ?my? and ?mine?, which was initiated in ?The Concept of ?Mine?; ? (Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 3). Socially accepted types of use ties (active and passive), worth ties and other sorts are distinguished from the previously noted ties of ownership, agency, etc. These further distinctions of ties, it is argued, also deserve the attention of philosophers and conceptually oriented social scientists. The analysis of ?mine? is then applied to (...) the much disputed concept of ?imagining?: some major clusters of divergent facts and phenomena called human imaginings are mapped and related to ?mine? (shrink)

M. Roch Bouchard has contributed an intriguing essay to Idealistic Studies: “Idealist Requirements and the Affirmation of the Other World—the Lachelier Case”. His subject, the distinguished French idealist, Jules Lachelier, is shown by M. Bouchard to have idealized in triumphantly paradoxical form certain tensions between Divine Immanence and Transcendence that have troubled Biblical religionists for millennia. Problems raised for the educated faithful by thinkers like Parmenides, Plotinus, Eriugena, Boehme, Spinoza, Goethe, and Hegel came home all at once to roost for (...) Lachelier, a devout Roman Catholic. (shrink)